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I. INTRODUCTION1 
 
The operative basis of the criminal justice system in the 
United States today is that a substantial number of people 
charged with crimes will resolve those charges by entering guilty 
pleas and forgoing their right to trial.  While plea bargaining is 
generally accepted as a necessary component of a well-
functioning justice system, an inevitable and hidden cost is that 
it can lead to innocent individuals pleading guilty to crimes they 
did not commit.2  The acceptance of plea bargaining is based on 
 
1  The Task Force wants to thank Morrison & Foerster LLP for hosting all 
of the Focus Group and Steering Committee sessions and a plenary Task Force 
meeting, and the New York County Lawyers’ Association (the “NYCLA”) for 
hosting an all-day Forum of the entire Task Force. The Task Force also wants 
to thank Tesser, Ryan & Rochman LLP, Colyn Eppes, Jackson Kerr, Randy 
Tesser, and Omar Evans for working tirelessly to conduct meetings, 
facilitating consensus, coordinating the preparation of this Report, and for 
keeping their heads and our heads level while immersed in this serious and 
compelling problem. Finally, the Task Force would like to acknowledge the 
efforts of the Honorable Judge Rakoff in bringing light to the issue of innocent 
people pleading guilty. 
2  Criminologists who have studied this phenomenon of innocent people 
pleading guilty “estimate that the overall rate for convicted felons as a whole 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/1
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there being the semblance of an actual bargain struck by 
relatively equally situated and informed parties.  But all too 
often this is a fiction.  When an innocent person is pressured to 
plead guilty, it undermines our fundamental expectation that 
criminal court procedure must lead to fair and just results.  If 
pressures leading to not truly bargained for pleas become 
endemic in the criminal justice system, they undermine the 
integrity and reliability of the system for all of us and breed 
disrespect for the courts, prosecutors, and the rule of law. 
The Plea Bargaining Task Force of the NYCLA Justice 
Center (“Task Force”) formed in 2018 at the suggestion of the 
chairs and under the auspices of the NYCLA Justice Center.  As 
part of its mission to combine NYCLA’s resources with other 
segments of the bench, bar, and community groups, the Task 
Force was asked to “identify and understand legal and social 
justice issues, promote access to justice, and act as a catalyst for 
meaningful improvement in, and a positive perception of, the 
administration of justice in New York State.”  The Task Force 
was also asked to investigate whether and why innocent people 
plead guilty to crimes they did not commit, to recommend 
practical and achievable steps to reduce the incidence of such 
pleas, and to improve both the implementation and public 
perception of fairness regarding the plea-bargaining process.  
Lew Tesser and Chet Kerr generously agreed to spearhead the 
project and, with the assistance of both the Justice Center and a 
steering committee, assembled a seventy-member task force 
consisting of experts with substantial experience and varied 
perspectives pertaining to the criminal justice system in the 
federal and state courts in New York City.  After a year of study, 
discussion and analysis, the Task Force has identified several 
factors that can powerfully influence an innocent person’s 
decision to plead guilty.  These are related to: inter alia, (1) 
systemic pressure for speed and efficiency of case processing, (2) 
the burden of repeated court appearances placed on the accused, 
and (3) unduly harsh sentences imposed on felony offenders who 
exercise their right to trial. 
Accused misdemeanants and felony offenders often plead 
guilty simply to “get the matter over with.”  Many make that 
 
is between two percent and eight percent.”  Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People 
Plead Guilty, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Nov. 20, 2014, at 7–8. 
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choice because they cannot bear the costs of repeated court 
appearances, including lost work and necessary childcare 
expenses.  Others make the choice without knowing how the plea 
might seriously prejudice their housing and employment 
opportunities.  For defendants accused of serious crimes, fear of 
a significantly longer jail or prison sentence after trial—
compared with the state’s offer of a much lower sentence in 
return for a guilty plea—can motivate even an innocent person 
to plead guilty quickly.  Finally, the enormous number of low-
level offenses charged and prosecuted in our lower courts 
disproportionately affects our most vulnerable populations, 
including the impoverished and people of color, resulting in a 
staggering number of people pleading guilty and being 
sentenced to undeserved and often harsh jail time or fines. 
 
To address these negative factors inherent to the criminal 
justice system, the Task Force has developed a set of proposals 
and recommendations that it believes will reduce their influence 
on the plea-bargaining system in New York, thereby potentially 
reducing the number of innocent individuals who feel pressured 
or compelled to enter guilty pleas.  These proposals include: 
 
Creating systems to reduce unnecessary court 
appearances; 
Developing ways to help defendants to become 
more knowledgeable decision-makers; 
Restoring judicial discretion with respect to 
sentencing outcomes and not penalizing 
defendants for rejecting a plea offer and 
proceeding to trial; and 
Increasing the decriminalization of low-level 
offenses and employing sensible strategies to 
manage the criminal process more effectively, 
acknowledging that administrative efficiency is 
not and should not be the determining factor in 
plea bargaining discussions. 
 
 
 
 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/1
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A. The Existence and Prevalence of the Problem 
 
Jury trials and an independent judiciary have long been 
recognized and celebrated as both a means to determine guilt or 
innocence and as a check on arbitrary government power.3  The 
reality today, however, is that few criminal defendants are tried 
by a jury of their peers.  Negotiated plea bargain agreements 
account for well over ninety percent of criminal dispositions—
with less than three percent of cases proceeding to trial—in both 
federal courts nationwide and in the New York State Courts.4  A 
principal reason for this wide use of plea bargaining is that, in 
the majority of cases, a negotiated plea agreement is seen as 
mutually beneficial for both an accused criminal defendant and 
the government.  The ability of prosecutors to offer, and a 
defendant to accept, a reduced charge and/or a shorter sentence 
in exchange for a plea of guilty satisfies several interests: (1) the 
defendant’s interest in obtaining the lowest sentence possible 
without facing the risk of trial; (2) the prosecutor’s interest in 
serving justice while conserving the resources of its office; and 
(3) the interest of the judicial system of achieving efficient 
resolutions of a large number of cases.5 
Exoneration data, scholarly estimates, and anecdotal 
 
3  See Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, Ph.D., The Innocent 
Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s 
Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7-15 (2013). 
4  John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, 
and Most who Do are Found Guilty, PEW RES. CTR. (June 11, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-
defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/ (based on research 
collected by the federal judiciary and the National Center for State Courts); 
John Gramlich, Federal Criminal Prosecutions Fall to Lowest Level in Nearly 
Two Decades, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/28/federal-criminal-
prosecutions-fall-to-lowest-level-in-nearly-two-decades/; Nat’l Ctr. for State 
Courts, 2017 Gen. Jurisdiction Criminal Jury Trials and Rates, New York, 
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://popup.ncsc.org/CSP/CSP_Intro.aspx (follow 
“Criminal” hyperlink; then follow “2018” hyperlink under “Select the Data 
Year”; then follow “Gen. Jurisdiction Criminal Jury Trials and Rates” 
hyperlink under “Select Chart/Table”; then follow “New York” hyperlink under 
“Select State(s)”) (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
5  See generally, F. Andrew Hessick III, Plea Bargaining and Convicting 
the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 
16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189 (2002). 
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evidence suggest, however, that there is a subset of criminal 
defendants who chose to plead guilty to crimes that they did not 
in fact commit.6  At the federal level, it is estimated that between 
two and eight percent of convicted defendants plead guilty to 
crimes for which they are factually innocent.7  While post-
conviction exoneration of defendants who have previously pled 
guilty is some evidence of the phenomenon,8 the nature of 
wrongful convictions, as well as the challenges of empirical 
research, have made it difficult to quantify the number of 
instances where someone who is factually innocent has entered 
a guilty plea.9  Nevertheless, the available sources cited herein 
all point to the same conclusion: that there are individual 
defendants who are pleading guilty notwithstanding their 
factual innocence and, thereafter, suffer unjustly the 
consequences of a criminal conviction.10  It is the position of the 
Justice Center and this Task Force that efforts must be made to 
reduce the incidence of innocent people pleading guilty. 
 
B. Why do Innocent People Plead Guilty? 
 
There are a variety of reasons that an innocent person might 
voluntarily enter a plea of guilty rather than seek vindication 
through a public trial.11  Notably, there are various institutional 
 
6  People v. Tiger, 110 N.E.3d 509, 525-6 (N.Y. 2018) (Wilson, J., 
dissenting). The Supreme Court has implicitly acknowledged the phenomenon 
of innocent people pleading guilty and has upheld the practice of a defendant 
entering a guilty plea while maintaining their innocence. See North Carolina 
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
7  See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 7-8; Daniel Givelber, Meaningless 
Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliability Acquit the Innocent, 49 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1343-44 (1997); cf. People v. Serrano, 206 N.E.2d 330 
(N.Y. 1965).  
8  See Exonerations in 2017, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Mar. 14, 
2018), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/ExonerationsIn20
17.pdf. 
9  See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 7-8. 
10  John H. Blume & Rebecca J. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually 
Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 172-80 
(2014); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 1117, 1117-
21 (2008); Givelber, supra note 7, at 1318-1320.   
11  Blume & Helm, supra note 10, at 172-80; see Tiger, 110 N.E.3d at 526-
7 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/1
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forces that might prompt this act.  These forces typically operate 
disproportionately on misdemeanor defendants as process-
related costs that they cannot bear, and for felony defendants, 
the threat of significantly longer sentences of incarceration for 
those who exercise their right to trial and are convicted. 
Even if a defendant believes that acquittal after trial is 
likely, trials can be long, difficult, and disruptive.12  Defendants 
may desire to spare themselves and their families the often 
excessively high expense and emotional cost associated with 
going to trial.  Entering a plea of guilty might well be seen as 
more acceptable than facing the exhaustive trial process, which 
can require missing work and having to make child care or elder 
care arrangements on short notice.  Because the plea-bargaining 
process (and other pre-trial procedures) can be arduous and 
anxiety-inducing, some defendants may choose to plead guilty 
merely to put an end to their present situation, particularly if 
they are in jail pending a trial or other resolution.13 
Prosecutors often have broad discretion in making charging 
decisions, including the ability to threaten more severe charges 
if a defendant declines a plea offer.14  In fact, post-trial sentences 
tend to be significantly higher than sentences offered in plea 
negotiations.15  Because of mandatory minimum sentence 
statutes, a prosecutor’s charging decisions can often dictate the 
resulting sentence after trial.  Some defendants may choose to 
accept a plea deal that carries a predictable outcome, rather 
than risk (even the unlikely chance) of a disproportionately more 
severe outcome after trial.  Some defendants may also choose to 
plead guilty to become eligible for beneficial programs, such as 
diversionary programs, for which they must be found guilty to 
be admitted.16 
Criminal defendants may also be unfamiliar with the 
criminal justice system and not fully understand that defense 
 
12   N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., PETIT JUROR’S HANDBOOK 10 (2015), 
https://www.nyjuror.gov/pdfs/hb_Petit.pdf  (“The average length of a criminal 
trial is five to ten days.”). 
13  See, e.g., Blume & Helm, supra note 10, at 173-74. 
14  See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). 
15  See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO 
SAVE IT 6 (2018) [hereinafter NACDL REPORT]. 
16  See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 216.05(4) (McKinney 2019). 
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attorneys are on their side.  As a result, defendants can feel 
powerless in a complex, opaque system, and may decide that 
entering a guilty plea, with its known and sometimes unknown 
attendant consequences, is better than being caught in a 
stressful situation about which they have little understanding 
and over which they perceive they have little or no control.  
Many defendants charged with crimes carrying short jail terms 
or probationary sentences do not always realize the future 
implications for housing and employment opportunities and will 
plead guilty to achieve what they perceive to be an 
inconsequential sentence. 
 
C. Recent, Relevant Criminal Justice Reform Efforts 
 
1. Bar Reports 
 
Several bar associations and other institutions have 
recently published reports focused on addressing flaws within 
our criminal justice system, including the plea-bargaining 
process.  The Task Force has reviewed and relied upon the 
following reports, which have been helpful in understanding the 
specific issues addressed in this Report. 
In 2018, the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (“NACDL”) issued a report discussing the phenomenon 
of the “trial penalty,” i.e., the “discrepancy between the sentence 
the prosecutor is willing to offer in exchange for a guilty plea and 
the sentence that would be imposed after a trial” if the defendant 
is convicted in federal courts.17  Based on its findings, the 
NACDL set out ten principles intended to guide ten specific 
recommendations for addressing this problem, some of which 
were particularly important to the Task Force’s work of 
identifying proposals to lessen the likelihood of innocent people 
pleading guilty.18  The principles related to the impact that the 
trial penalty and plea bargaining practices had on the role of the 
justice system. 
In 2019, the New York State Bar Association’s second Task 
Force on Wrongful Convictions (“TFWC”) published a report, 
 
17  See NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, at 5-6. 
18  Id. at 11-12. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/1
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expanding on the findings of an earlier TFWC report from 2009, 
which had identified six causes that were “primary factors 
responsible for wrongful convictions.”19  These factors included: 
identification procedures, mishandling of forensic evidence, use 
of false confessions, errors by law enforcement (including 
prosecutors), defense practices, and the use of jailhouse 
informants.20  After reviewing recent data and developments 
over the past decade, the 2019 TFWC Report advocates that: 
 
each District Attorney’s Office in the State of New 
York establish a Conviction Integrity Unit 
(“CIU”), or, where not feasible, create a program 
for conviction review;21 and 
the New York Legislature add a new subsection 
(h) to section 440.10 of the New York Criminal 
Procedure Law that would permit a newly 
discovered evidence claim after a guilty plea.22 
 
2. Prosecutorial Reform 
 
In 2019, Kings County District Attorney Eric Gonzalez 
published an action plan for his office with the intention that it 
serve as a “national model of what a progressive prosecutor’s 
office can be.”23  The action plan may well have the effect of 
 
19  N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, REPORT 
OF TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 5 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 TFWC 
REPORT]. See generally N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK 
FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (2009). 
20  2019 TFWC REPORT, supra note 19, at 5. 
21  Id. at 6. 
22  Id. at 10. In People v. Tiger, 110 N.E.3d 509, 514-17 (N.Y. 2018), the 
New York Court of Appeals held that a motion to vacate a judgment of guilty 
in a criminal proceeding based on newly discovered evidence is not available 
where the defendant has voluntarily entered a plea of guilty. Id. at 99-102 n.7.   
23  ERIC GONZALEZ, BROOKLYN DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, JUSTICE 2020 at 9 
(2019), http://brooklynda.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Justice2020-
Report.pdf. District Attorney Gonzalez’s plan aims to take a targeted approach 
in dealing with crime in Kings County, focusing resources on “identifying and 
removing from the community those who cause the most harm . . . while 
diverting out of the criminal justice system or into community-based services 
those who don’t pose a threat to public safety.” Id. at 8. In order to achieve 
those goals, the Kings County action plan focused on four main areas: 1) 
9
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reducing the amount of innocent people pleading guilty through, 
inter alia, expanded diversionary programs and exploring new 
alternatives to incarceration. 
 
3. Recent Legislative Amendments to the Criminal Justice 
System in New York 
 
In April 2019, the New York State Legislature passed 
comprehensive reforms to its Criminal Procedure Law, which 
took effect in January 2020 (the “2019 NY Criminal Justice 
Reform Legislation”).  These reforms focus on changes to the bail 
system, criminal discovery and speedy trial requirements under 
New York law.  The Task Force studied these legislative changes 
and considered how they might potentially affect innocent 
individuals pleading guilty.  In particular, the Task Force has 
considered how a lengthy pre-trial detention and a lack of access 
to discoverable information in the early stages of a case can have 
a coercive impact on an innocent defendant’s decision whether 
to plead guilty.24 
First, the new legislation eliminates cash bail for all 
misdemeanors and class E felonies (the lowest level of felony 
offense), with some minor exceptions.  Instead, police officers are 
required to serve desk appearance tickets, allowing individuals 
to remain at liberty pending the resolution of their cases.25  This 
bold reform aims to decrease the disruption in individuals’ lives 
when they have been arrested and accused of committing low-
level offenses.  Instead of spending a night, multiple nights, or 
months in jail because they cannot afford to post bail, people will 
attend their jobs, take care of their families, and otherwise live 
their normal lives as they await court dates.  The new bail 
legislation also incentivizes judges to release individuals under 
non-monetary conditions rather than holding them in pre-trial 
 
reducing incarceration by making jail the “alternative”; 2) engaging 
communities as partners in justice; 3) focusing resources on the drivers of 
crime; and 4) transforming and educating the internal culture of the DA’s 
office. Id. at 12-13. 
24  See Blume & Helm, supra note 10, at 173-74, 183; Hessick III, supra 
note 5, at 211-15; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, 
and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full 
Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 307-09 (2008). 
25  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10 (McKinney 2019). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/1
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detention, unless a court determines an individual to be a flight 
risk.26  The new legislation is expected to decrease the number 
of individuals who are being held in pre-trial detention. 
Second, the new discovery statute calls for open discovery in 
all criminal cases and further requires prosecutors to turn over 
their discovery to defendants within fifteen days of a defendant’s 
arraignment.27  More transparent discovery practices ensure 
that defendants are better informed about the facts of their cases 
as they weigh the decision of whether to plead guilty or take 
their case to trial.  In particular, the new discovery legislation 
assures that defendants will have access to the prosecution’s 
discoverable material before accepting a plea offer.28  This will 
help close the information gap between prosecutors and 
defendants, which previously led some defendants to feel coerced 
into accepting a plea deal without an understanding of the 
government’s case. 
Third, the changes to speedy trial requirements provide 
that, when the prosecution informs the court that they are ready 
for trial, they must sign a certificate of compliance that the new 
discovery requirements have been met, and the defendant will 
have a chance to object on the record if this is not the case.29  
Moreover, if the prosecution notifies the court that they are 
ready to proceed with trial, but subsequently requests more 
time, the court will approve the request only upon “a showing of 
sufficient supporting facts.”  This legislative change is likely to 
shorten the pre-trial detention period for many defendants. 
These reforms are relevant to the problem of innocent 
 
26  Id. § 510.10(1). 
27  The breadth of this initial discovery obligations includes, inter alia, all 
Rosario material, grand jury testimony of the victim and the defendant, names 
and contact information of witnesses (with certain exceptions), police reports, 
search warrants and accompanying affidavits in support of the warrants, 
electronically stored information, and criminal conviction records of both the 
defendant and prosecution witnesses. See id. § 245.10. 
28  When a defendant is charged with a felony, and the prosecution makes 
a pre-indictment plea offer to a crime, the prosecutor must disclose all 
discoverable items not less than three calendar days prior to the expiration 
date of any plea offer or any deadline imposed by the court for acceptance of 
the plea offer. Id. § 245.25(1). When a defendant is charged with a 
misdemeanor and the prosecution makes a pre-indictment plea offer, the 
prosecution must disclose its discoverable material within seven calendar days 
of the expiration of the plea offer. Id. § 245.25(2). 
29  Id. § 30.30(5). 
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people pleading guilty, and it is expected that, if fully and 
effectively implemented, they will serve to moderate some of the 
coercive aspects of plea bargaining.  Taken together, these 
studies, policy initiatives, and recently-passed laws indicate that 
justice professionals are open to taking a fresh look at the issue 
of plea bargaining compelling innocent people to plead guilty. 
 
II.NYCLA’S JUSTICE CENTER TASK FORCE30 
 
A. Mission & Composition of Task Force 
 
The mission of the Task Force is to research and evaluate 
the issue of innocent people pleading guilty and to identify some 
practical and achievable solutions to prevent this phenomenon 
from happening.  In order to efficiently utilize the resources of 
the Task Force, we focused our research primarily on the 
processes, procedures, and rules applicable to the Federal and 
State courts in the New York City Metropolitan 
area.  Nevertheless, the Task Force hopes that the proposals, 
individually and collectively, will serve as a model for New York 
State, other states, and the federal government for reducing the 
occurrence of this disturbing phenomenon.  Additionally, the 
problem of innocent people pleading guilty extends to both 
felonies and misdemeanors.  Accordingly, both levels of offenses 
were studied and proposals are made that have applicability to 
both felonies and misdemeanors. 
The Task Force was composed of approximately 70 
members, including former appellate court and criminal court 
judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, law school professors and 
other leaders of the bar.  In the rare circumstance in which 
general consensus was not manifest, it is noted in this Report.  
The Roster of the Task Force is shown in Appendix A. 
 
B. The Task Force Process 
 
The Justice Center created the Task Force in late 2018.  The 
 
30  The views set forth in this report do not necessarily reflect the 
individual views of all members of the Task Force or of any organization with 
which they are associated.   
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Task Force quickly identified and collected a wide range of law 
review articles, bar reports and case law addressing the issue of 
plea bargaining, and made that research available to all Task 
Force Members.  The Task Force held its first plenary meeting 
on January 22, 2019, to discuss its mandate and the process it 
would use to evaluate the issue of innocent defendants pleading 
guilty and to identify proposals to address this issue.  The 
Honorable Jed S. Rakoff delivered the keynote address. 
The Task Force conducted an exhaustive review of the 
history of plea bargaining and determined that it would be 
neither advisable nor practicable to endorse a wholesale 
overhaul of the plea bargaining system, which the Supreme 
Court has described as “not only an essential part of the 
[criminal justice] process, but a highly desirable part for many 
reasons.”31  During the spring of 2019, the Task Force held a 
series of focus groups where Task Force members considered a 
wide range of substantive and procedural issues that arise over 
the duration of a criminal proceeding.  The operating theory was 
that discussions by knowledgeable people with on-the-ground 
experience, looking at the various stages of the criminal and 
plea-bargaining process, might expose opportunities for 
corrective action that would not endanger public safety.  Each of 
the six focus group meetings was open to the entire Task Force.  
Nearly the entire Task Force participated in one or more of the 
focus groups. 
The focus group discussions examined how each of these 
issues impacted defendants, defense counsel, prosecutors, and 
judges as a case moved through the system and how that, in 
turn, could potentially motivate—or pressure—innocent people 
to plead guilty.  Based on these discussions, participants in the 
focus groups identified potential reforms. 
In the initial stages of the focus group discussions, the Task 
Force determined that the topics of bail, criminal discovery, and 
speedy trial were areas of possible concern, in part because the 
then current system was perceived as unduly burdensome on 
 
31  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). For more information 
on the history of plea bargaining, see generally Albert Alschuler, Plea 
Bargaining and its History, 79 COL. L. REV. 1 (Jan. 1979), and Special Issue on 
Plea Bargaining – Historical Perspectives, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 189, 211-285 
(1979).   
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defendants, thus adding pressure on defendants to plead guilty.  
However, after the 2019 New York Criminal Justice Reform 
Legislation passed, the Task Force decided that it would be more 
effective to support and supplement the efforts of the New York 
legislature, rather than propose entirely new initiatives in these 
areas.  The Task Force discussed potential challenges that 
defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges might face in adapting 
to the new legislative framework, and whether there were any 
initiatives that it could undertake to ease this transition 
consistent with the goal of reducing the incidence of innocent 
people pleading guilty. 
 
C. Topics Studied by the Focus Groups 
 
1. Charging 
 
The Task Force considered the role of prosecutorial 
discretion in our justice system, including balancing the 
presumption of innocence, managing prosecutorial resources, 
the values of an adversarial justice system, and the role of grand 
juries in moderating prosecutorial discretion.  The Task Force 
also discussed unintended consequences that have stemmed 
from the current state of prosecutorial discretion, such as public 
perceptions of incongruent leverage between prosecutors and 
defendants, the ability to charge multiple degrees of the same 
offense and multiple offenses based on the same conduct, and 
reliance on police reporting which might not be sufficiently 
confirmed. 
 
2. Role of Defense Counsel 
 
The Task Force considered the role of defense counsel within 
the criminal justice system and how the limits of that role might 
contribute to the phenomenon of innocent people pleading 
guilty.  Topics explored included how and when defense counsels 
communicate with their clients, how the plea-bargaining process 
is affected by the mistrust of prosecutors among defense counsel, 
the lack of funding for defense counsel, and the impact of delay 
tactics by both prosecutors and defense counsel during pretrial 
proceedings.  Additionally, the Task Force discussed time 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/1
2020 SOLVING INNOCENTS PLEADING GUILTY 15 
 
pressures in the plea-bargaining process and the way defense 
counsels’ limited access to their clients often resulted in 
insufficient time to speak with them about their cases. 
 
3. Judicial Involvement in the Plea-Bargaining Process 
 
The Task Force considered the differing approaches to 
judicial participation in the plea-bargaining process in the New 
York state courts and in federal court.  The Task Force examined 
how judicial involvement in the plea-bargaining process could 
risk influencing the defendant’s plea, learning confidential 
information, and giving the appearance of being a biased party.  
The Task Force also considered whether judicial involvement in 
plea bargaining would allow judges to ensure that defendants 
are informed, acting as a check on misconduct and the imbalance 
of power between litigants, and increasing perceptions of 
fairness. 
 
4. Sentencing 
 
The Task Force examined the history and intent of 
mandatory minimum sentence statutes and sentencing 
guidelines at both the State and Federal levels.  The Task Force 
discussed the positive effects of these statutes and guidelines, 
such as deterrence from committing crimes, and the potentially 
problematic effects, such as widening the gap between pre-trial 
and post-sentences, which some argue can coerce defendants to 
plead guilty. 
 
 
D. Developing and Selecting Potential Solutions 
 
Guided by its research and the focus group process, the Task 
Force initially identified over one hundred proposals that, if 
implemented, could potentially reduce the number of innocent 
people who plead guilty.  These proposals were circulated to, and 
ranked by, the members of the Task Force.  In evaluating which 
proposals to potentially adopt, the Task Force considered both 
the likelihood and extent to which such proposals would reduce 
the incidence of innocent people pleading guilty, as well as the 
15
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feasibility of implementing such proposals.  The twelve highest 
ranked proposals were then discussed and debated at the Task 
Force’s second plenary session on May 9, 2019.  Following these 
extensive deliberations, the Task Force voted on which proposals 
were most likely to effect positive change for innocent 
defendants (as well as the criminal justice system at large) and 
could be realistically implemented.32  The recommendations in 
this Report and the following declaration are the result of this 
multistage process. 
 
III. DECLARATION THAT EFFICIENCY OF THE CRIMINAL  
JUSTICE PROCESS SHOULD NOT BE A DETERMINATIVE  
FACTOR FOR MAKING PLEA BARGAINING DECISIONS 
 
A common foundational principle cutting across all points of 
concern the Task Force identified is that procedural efficiency 
should not produce unjust outcomes.  Throughout the focus 
group meetings, there was a recurring discussion about the role 
of “efficiency” in the criminal justice system and whether it 
provides a justification for current plea-bargaining practices.  
The Task Force recognized that the drive for efficiency in the 
criminal justice system —and an attendant pressure to plea 
bargain—can sometimes reflect and be driven by powerful 
institutional pressures to reduce costs and preserve resources.  
This ongoing dialogue set the stage for the generation of a 
number of proposals, some of which were ultimately adopted in 
this Report. 
The Task Force has determined that the current plea-
bargaining system as it operates in New York effectively 
incentivizes criminal defendants to plead guilty, forfeiting their 
constitutional rights to avoid the time, risk, and cost of a trial by 
jury.  While plea bargaining is an important, and arguably 
necessary, component of this country’s criminal justice system, 
the Task Force believes that encouraging defendants to plead 
 
32  The Task Force decided that any proposals enacted in this Report must 
be generally endorsable by all of the various stakeholders in the criminal 
justice system—prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, academics, and policy 
advocates—all of whom are represented on the Task Force. Drafts of the report 
were also shared with knowledgeable people from groups outside the Justice 
Center. 
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guilty cannot and should not be justified by institutional 
pressure from judges, prosecutors and/or defense counsel to 
preserve financial resources and avoid the necessary costs of a 
fair system of justice.  Administrative efficiency and cost savings 
are worthy goals, but protecting the bedrock constitutional 
values at play in the operation of a legitimate criminal justice 
system must be paramount.  To preserve these important values, 
it is essential that administrative efficiency must not be a 
determinative factor for making plea bargaining decisions. 
The fundamental Constitutional rights afforded to any 
person charged with a crime—the privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury and the right to 
confront one’s accusers—are essential to protect individuals 
from arbitrary governmental power, and serve to safeguard and 
validate the basic assumption that all defendants are innocent 
until proven guilty.  Entering a plea of guilty necessarily 
requires a defendant to waive these rights and accept the finality 
of a criminal conviction. 
The Task Force recognizes that, in appropriate cases, a plea 
of guilty can serve both a defendant’s needs and society’s 
interests in a fair, just, and efficiently run criminal justice 
system.  For this reason, the United States Supreme Court has 
long affirmed that a system that allows for guilty pleas—and 
that requires defendants who are charged with a crime to waive 
fundamental Constitutional rights—has many benefits for both 
defendants and society as a whole.33 
Speed and the administrative efficacy of moving individuals 
charged with crimes quickly through the justice system, 
motivated by an interest in attendant cost savings, cannot alone 
justify the cost of waiving constitutional protections.  The 
Supreme Court has made clear that “while justice should be 
administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly 
expedition and not mere speed.”34  Thus, the Court has 
emphasized the importance of defendants having a full and fair 
opportunity to assert their procedural and substantive rights, 
even if that slows down the criminal process. 
 
 
33  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970). 
34  Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1950).   
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[I]n large measure because of the many 
procedural safeguards provided an accused, the 
ordinary procedures for criminal prosecution are 
designed to move at a deliberate pace. A 
requirement of unreasonable speed would have a 
deleterious effect both upon the rights of the 
accused and upon the ability of society to protect 
itself.35 
 
This balance can be severely tested by institutional and 
cost-saving pressures to process defendants quickly through the 
criminal justice system by relying on plea bargaining to resolve 
the vast majority of criminal cases.  There are statutory and 
institutional incentives for persons charged with a crime not 
only to plead guilty, but also to enter a plea early in the process 
even if the defendant may not yet have a full understanding of 
the factual basis of the charges they face.  This is especially true 
when local governments, judges and prosecutors are faced with 
financial pressures to allocate limited resources to address a 
large number of criminal defendants, many of whom are poor 
and cannot afford criminal representation of their own.  As noted 
above, the institutional pressures to reduce costs and protect 
“scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources” is actually cited as 
a basis for justifying the use of guilty pleas instead of allowing 
full criminal trials.36  In the federal system, criminal defendants 
can receive a reduction in sentence by agreeing to plead guilty 
early in the process “thereby permitting the government to avoid 
preparing for trial and permitting the court to allocate its 
resources efficiently.”37 
 
35  United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (emphasis added); see 
Darryl K. Brown, Essay: The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 
100 VA. L. REV. 183 (2014). 
36  Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.   
37  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E.1.1(b) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). This guideline, which allows for a downward 
adjustment in the initial calculation of a possible criminal sentence, falls 
within the adjustment factor known as “Acceptance of Responsibility.” As 
made clear in the Commentary Notes, “[t]he timeliness of the defendant’s 
acceptance of responsibility is a consideration under both subsections [a and 
b]” of this adjustment factor. Id. § 3E.1.1 cmt. n. 6. See generally Margareth 
Etienne, Acceptance of Responsibility and Plea Bargaining Under the Feeney 
Amendment, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 109 (2003). 
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When defendants feel pressured to barter their 
constitutional rights in order to save administrative costs, the 
system unavoidably breeds cynicism.  The Task Force recognizes 
that the added pressures to process defendants quickly can be 
especially acute for those charged individuals who are factually 
innocent and are presented with plea deals seemingly endorsed 
by judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, all of whom have an 
interest in keeping the system moving.  There are inherent, 
conflicting pressures faced by anyone charged with a crime when 
considering whether to plead guilty, but impelling individuals 
who may not have committed a crime to nevertheless plead 
guilty to meet the goals of saving money and administrative 
efficiency is an especially insidious attack on constitutional 
protections that serve us all. 
Thus, the Task Force believes that pursuing 
“administrative efficiency” in our system of plea bargaining—
focusing solely on the expeditious processing of defendants 
through the criminal justice system for the purpose of saving 
money and resources—should not be and cannot be the driver of 
a fair criminal system.  Plea bargaining is, and will likely 
remain, a key part of our justice system, but its ongoing validity 
necessarily depends upon the ability of individuals charged with 
a crime to assert their rights secured by the Constitution 
without penalty.  Accordingly, when evaluating how to improve 
our plea-bargaining system to reduce the number of innocent 
individuals who plead guilty—as well as protect all defendants 
charged with a crime—the safeguarding of every individual’s 
ability to assert and exercise their rights must be paramount. 
Emphasizing the importance of allowing all defendants to 
freely choose to assert these constitutional rights—even 
defendants who choose to plead guilty—is consistent with, if not 
required by, the Constitution. 
 
The establishment of prompt efficacious 
procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a 
proper state interest worthy of cognizance in 
constitutional adjudication.  But the Constitution 
recognizes higher values than speed and 
efficiency.  Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill 
of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause 
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in particular, that they were designed to protect 
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from 
the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy 
that may characterize praiseworthy government 
officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre 
ones.38 
 
These important values of promoting the exercise of 
Constitutional rights by criminal defendants over the need to 
process them quickly through a criminal system primarily made 
up of plea bargaining remain as important today as they did fifty 
years ago.  Justice Gorsuch recently made this point forcefully 
in a case dealing with whether or not a defendant was entitled 
to a jury trial before he could be sentenced to the maximum 
sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. 
 
Jury trials are inconvenient for the government.  
Yet like much else in our Constitution, the jury 
system isn’t designed to promote efficiency but to 
protect liberty. . . . This Court has repeatedly 
sought to guard the historic role of the jury 
against such incursions.  For “however convenient 
these may appear at first, (as doubtless all 
arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most 
convenient) yet let it be again remembered, that 
delays, and little inconveniences in the forms of 
justice, are the price that all free nations must pay 
for their liberty in more substantial matters.”39 
 
For all these reasons, the Task Force believes that cost 
savings in the operation of the criminal justice system should 
not be found through rewarding guilty pleas or by punishing 
defendants who decline to sacrifice their constitutional rights.  
The system should look elsewhere to find savings. 
 
38  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); accord Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 646 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 690 (1973).   
39  United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2384 (2019) (quoting 4 W. 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 298, 344 (1769)). 
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IV. TASK FORCE PROPOSALS 
 
A. Proposal No. 1: Reduce Unnecessary Appearances by 
Defendants 
 
The Task Force determined that many participants in the 
criminal justice process—prosecutors, defense counsel and 
judges—believe that repeated court appearances by defendants, 
whether they are at liberty or are incarcerated, impose added 
and undue pressure.  This may result in some number of 
individuals pleading guilty just to end the process, including 
those defendants who are in fact innocent. 
The need to attend repeated court appearances can be 
extremely disruptive to a defendant’s everyday life.  For those 
defendants who are not being held pre-trial, they are often 
compelled to disrupt their daily routine to appear for court 
appearances.  If the defendant has a job, they may need to take 
a day off from work or, if that is not possible, get coverage from 
a co-worker or risk being fired.  They might need to reveal to 
their employer or co-worker that they had been charged with a 
crime, a serious privacy concern.  Even if a defendant has 
permission to take time off and go to court for a court 
appearance, scheduling changes are constant in the New York 
court system, and many defendants may end up having to come 
back to court repeatedly.  To meet these scheduling demands, a 
defendant may need to cancel appointments, arrange and pay 
for childcare or elder care, and deal with many other disruptions 
to their everyday routine.  This can be extremely burdensome, 
especially if a defendant needs to appear in court four, five, or 
even ten times during the disposition of their case, which often 
may result in the loss of employment. 
Even when a defendant is being held in pre-trial detention, 
attending multiple court days can be extremely stressful, 
especially for a defendant who is factually innocent.  A defendant 
will be awakened very early in the morning for transport and be 
required to travel a significant distance to get to the courthouse 
where they will sit in a holding cell until their case is called.  The 
defendant may have limited access to food and water while they 
are waiting for their case to be heard.  Some defendants will wait 
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in the holding cell in the courthouse all day only to learn that 
they will be traveling back to the jailhouse and doing it over 
again the following day because their case was not called. 
The Task Force found that these lengthy and often 
unnecessary court appearances can be extremely disruptive and 
impose substantial pressure on a defendant during the pretrial 
process.  The Task Force further found that the need to make 
repeated appearances, with the resulting substantial 
disruptions in a defendant’s everyday life, imposes substantial 
pressure on defendants to terminate the proceedings by pleading 
guilty.  The Task Force believes that reducing the need for these 
appearances can potentially relieve some of this pressure and, 
thus, make it less likely that individuals who are innocent will 
nonetheless feel they have no choice but to plead guilty. 
The Task Force proposes that an accused defendant should 
not be required to attend any hearing or court appearance where 
there will be no substantive determination of the merits or case 
disposition, and/or where there will be no impact on the 
defendant’s substantive constitutional rights, unless the court 
specifically directs the defendant to be present.  Thus, the 
defendant will not need to be present for mere ministerial or 
scheduling hearings that will not impact the ultimate 
disposition of his or her case. 
The Task Force further proposes that an accused person, 
with no criminal history, no previous warrants, or an overall 
history of regularly attending court proceedings should be 
deemed presumptively excused from certain court proceedings.  
An “eligible” court proceeding is one at which there is no realistic 
possibility of case disposition or of any proceedings regarding the 
merits of the case, or where the input, participation, or presence 
of the accused is unnecessary.  Additionally, an accused person 
with employment, educational, family care responsibilities, or 
other life situations that make repeated court appearances 
difficult or impossible could be excused whenever possible. 
 
1. Implementation Considerations 
 
All decisions regarding excusal of an accused shall be made 
by the court, on application of defense counsel, giving the 
prosecutor an opportunity to be heard.  Those applications shall 
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be made on the record with respect to each prospective court 
adjourn date, and with the appropriate notations made on the 
court file.  Counsel should confer in advance of the call of the 
case, to discuss whether the presence of the accused will be 
necessary on the next adjourn date. 
In the event an accused advises court personnel that an 
unexpected pressing commitment has arisen, the court should 
endeavor to cooperate with the accused so that their 
commitment can be accommodated, to the extent possible.  If the 
accused’s presence is determined to be necessary, the court 
should explain why an accommodation is not possible and 
attempt to fashion some alternate solution. 
When the court has granted defense counsel’s application to 
excuse the accused from appearing on the next court date, court 
personnel should provide the accused with written notice 
indicating that the defendant’s presence is excused and contact 
information for the courtroom where the case will next appear.  
The notice should advise that any intentional failure to appear 
at future court dates may result in the issuance of a bench 
warrant.  Additionally, courts should be encouraged to give 
Parker warnings,40 orally and in writing, at the first 
adjournment and defendants should be promptly notified of 
what occurred when they were not present. 
Incarcerated accused persons may be permitted to waive 
their appearance in court, at future “eligible” court proceedings, 
by waiving their right to appear on the record during the 
preceding court date.  As video technology advances and becomes 
more generally available in courtrooms, courts can explore its 
use as a way to facilitate appearances, for both defendants who 
are incarcerated and for defendants who are not incarcerated 
pretrial.41 
 
40   See People v. Parker, 440 N.E.2d 1313, 1314-16 (N.Y.1982) (holding, 
inter alia, that where a defendant has actual notice of a trial date and 
voluntarily fails to appear, that defendant has not therefore implicitly 
relinquished their right to be present at trial); see N.Y. State Unified Court 
Sys., Parker Warning, http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/8-
Colloquies/Admonition-Parker.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). A Parker 
warning is an affirmative notice to a defendant that they have a right to be 
present in court and that they can, by their conduct, waive, forfeit, or lose that 
right. See id. 
41  See infra part IV(B)(1). As discussed infra, video conferencing should 
not be used as a wholesale substitute for in-person meetings between attorneys 
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Implementation of these proposals, with the exception of 
those requiring increased personnel and financial support, will 
likely not require additional statutory authority or modification 
of court rules.  Rather, whether it occurs on a court-by-court or 
county-by-county basis, individual defense counsel can make 
applications to have their clients excused or placed on telephone 
alert.  The Task Force hopes that, by highlighting the problems 
that can arise from requiring repeated appearances by 
defendants, prosecutors, defense counsel and the courts will be 
increasingly receptive to excusing accused individuals from 
appearing when appearance is unnecessary. 
 
 
B. Proposal No. 2: Facilitate Pre-Trial Communication 
between Incarcerated Clients and Defense Counsel 
 
At the heart of the attorney-client relationship lies attorney-
client communication, and the trust between an attorney and 
their client.  Effective communication is a vital method for the 
mutual transmission of information, the building of a 
relationship of trust, and the development of strategy by defense 
counsel and client.  To be effective, it requires, among other 
things, sufficient privacy and adequate time. 
Despite the importance of effective attorney-client 
communication, significant factors can impede the ability to 
communicate, especially for clients who are in custody pretrial.  
If attorney-client communication only consists of a few rushed 
minutes near the courtroom when an incarcerated client is 
brought for an appearance, the rare visit at a correctional 
facility, or the occasional phone call, it is much more difficult to 
build a relationship of trust between a defendant and defense 
counsel. 
The Task Force found that ineffective communication can 
lead to frustration and distrust of the criminal justice system by 
defendants and impose added pressure on innocent defendants 
when presented with a proposed plea agreement.  Many 
defendants do not have a sophisticated understanding of the 
criminal justice process and, therefore, are reliant on their 
 
and clients.   
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counsel to advise them as their case proceeds.  Moreover, 
defendants may not understand why their case seems not to be 
progressing even though they have been to court multiple times.  
Ensuring effective communication with counsel allows 
defendants to navigate the criminal justice process more 
effectively and helps them to avoid making rash decisions, such 
as pleading guilty to a crime they did not commit simply to end 
the process. 
For those in custody, the pressure to accept a guilty plea is 
particularly significant, as a defendant may perceive, 
incorrectly, that taking a plea offers the quickest prospect of 
freedom.  If defense counsel can effectively communicate with 
their clients, they can counter this pressure in various ways, 
such as educating their clients about the criminal justice 
process, gaining information that will strengthen arguments for 
taking a case to trial, making applicable pretrial motions, 
discussing possible trial strategies, and offering support and 
hope.  Conversely, in those situations where it might be in a 
client’s best interest to accept a plea deal rather than proceeding 
with a case, the lack of adequate communication can frustrate 
that outcome.  In short, improved access to defense counsel will 
grant more defendants the ability to confidently make informed 
decisions about whether to plead guilty. 
The Task Force specifically focused on those defendants who 
are in the pre-adjudication custody of the New York City 
Department of Correction (“DOC”) and the need to improve 
communication between defense counsel and their clients at the 
City’s correctional facilities. 
 
1. Reform the Scheduling Procedure and Facility 
Accommodations for In-Person Visits with Clients at 
Correctional Facilities 
 
One of the barriers to effective communication between 
attorneys and their incarcerated clients is the amount of time 
and difficulty it takes to visit clients at the City’s correctional 
facilities, especially Rikers Island.42  Rikers Island is 
 
42  The DOC’s facility at Rikers Island actually consists of ten separate 
jail facilities, all of which must be accessed through the Benjamin Ward Visit 
Center. 
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inconveniently located, and the process for visiting with a 
defendant in custody is highly inefficient and often involves 
substantial wait times.  Once through the initial security 
checkpoint at Rikers, attorneys must wait for a bus to take them 
to the specific facility where their client is held.  After arriving 
at that specific facility, attorneys must once again go through 
security and can often wait for over an hour for a client to be 
brought to the visiting area to have an in-person meeting.   
The Task Force proposes that the DOC permit attorneys to 
schedule in-person meetings at correctional facilities at specific, 
designated times so that clients can be brought in advance and 
attorneys are not required to endure long wait times. 
The DOC is already using this type of scheduling process for 
video conferencing, which has proven to be more effective at 
ensuring that clients are in a certain place at a certain time.  
Currently, if an attorney wants to meet with a client for a video 
conference, a call is placed by the attorney’s office to the specific 
facility where the client is being held to schedule the conference.  
Video conferences are available weekdays between 9:00 a.m. and 
4:30 p.m., generally in thirty-minute increments.  After the 
conference has been scheduled, the attorney’s office must email 
a “production sheet” to the DOC with specific information about 
the client, the attorney, and the conference.  All of this must 
happen by 3:30 p.m. the day before the scheduled conference. 
At the date and time of the scheduled visit, the client is 
brought to the video conference area of the facility in which they 
are being held.  The attorney calls that facility to confirm the 
client is present, and then places a call to the Office of Court 
Administration’s (“OCA”) Video Conference Unit, who connects 
the attorney’s office to the booth the client has been placed in at 
the facility for the meeting. 
The Task Force proposes that this same type of advance 
scheduling process be adopted for in-person meetings between 
counsel and a defendant.  The attorney’s office could call the 
specific facility where their client is being held in advance to 
schedule the meeting.43  The attorney’s office would then send a 
 
43  The 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. scheduling limitations for video conferences 
should not be applicable in this instance because those times are constrained 
by the OCA Video Conference Unit’s working hours. Because the OCA does not 
play any role in scheduling in-person meetings, the times could be extended. 
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“production sheet” to the DOC with the required information by 
3:30 p.m. the day before the scheduled meeting.  It would then 
be up to the attorney to arrive at Rikers Island thirty minutes 
prior to the start of the scheduled meeting to allow them time to 
clear security and arrive at the specific facility.   
The Task Force anticipates that the DOC will express 
concern that attorneys will fail to show up for meetings at the 
scheduled time.  As with video conferences, there should be a 
cancellation window before the meeting is scheduled to start.  
Attorneys who know that they will not be able to attend the 
meeting due to unforeseen circumstances must call and cancel 
by the determined cancellation time to ensure that clients are 
not needlessly moved around the facility.  Attorneys must also 
make sure to schedule meetings only during times when they 
are confident they will be available.44 
This simple change in scheduling policy would save time 
and greatly aid in facilitating communication between defense 
attorneys and their incarcerated clients. 
 
2. Create Remote Communication Procedures for Incarcerated 
Clients 
 
The Task Force believes that the value of in-person 
meetings between incarcerated clients and defense counsel 
cannot be overstated.  Unlike other forms of communication, in-
person meetings allow defense counsel to (1) present and explain 
relevant documents to their client; (2) analyze the validity of the 
client’s version of the factual nuances of the case; and (3) assess 
their client’s physical and mental well-being.  Moreover, in-
person communication demonstrates to incarcerated clients that 
they have an advocate in their corner who is fervently 
advocating for their best interests. 
The unfortunate reality, however, is that defense counsels, 
and especially public defenders, have limited opportunities to 
make personal visits to jails to discuss their clients’ cases. The 
Task Force believes this problem can be remedied by making it 
 
44  Scheduling a visit should not be required—an attorney could still show 
up at their own convenience just as before and choose to wait for a client to be 
brought to the visiting area at the correction facility. 
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easier for defense counsel to communicate with their clients by 
telephone. 
The Task Force recommends that procedures be adopted by 
the DOC and other institutions that would allow defense 
counsels to contact their clients by telephone at specific 
designated times.  Facilities can set aside time for inmates to 
receive calls from defense counsel at workable times, for 
example, taking into account daily routines such as meals, 
counts, and lockdowns.  The Task Force also recommends that 
counsel be able to schedule calls in the same way video 
conferences are currently scheduled. 
Remote communications also play a vital role in ensuring 
adequate attorney-client communication.  Incarcerated clients 
must know that they have the ability to reach out and 
communicate with their counsel.  Making private remote 
communications between counsel and their client more 
accessible allows defense counsel to provide updates about the 
status of their case, develop a rapport with their client, and 
lessen the client’s feeling of despair and being “lost in the 
system.”  Remote communication also allows counsel with large 
caseloads to regularly stay in contact with clients without 
devoting significant portions of a day to make personal visits, 
and should alleviate the frustration a client experiences when 
he or she attempts to call counsel and is unable to reach them. 
As video conference technology continues to develop, the 
Task Force recommends that the DOC explore how to expand 
the availability of video conferencing for defendants and their 
counsel.  This includes increasing the number of rooms available 
for defendants to use for video conferences with their attorneys 
and utilizing the DOC procedures already in place.45  The Task 
Force further recommends the expansion of the availability of 
telephonic communications between attorneys and incarcerated 
clients. 
 
C. Proposal No. 3: Provide Defendants with Educational 
Resources About the Criminal Justice System, Criminal 
Procedure, and What to Expect as their Case Proceeds. 
 
 
45  See supra part IV(B)(1). 
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The vast majority of criminal defendants lack basic 
knowledge of substantive or procedural criminal law.  In 
addition, despite the best efforts of defense counsel, many 
defendants have only a limited understanding about what has 
happened and what is likely to happen as their case progresses.  
The Task Force is concerned that this lack of information may 
prevent defendants from making well-informed decisions 
regarding plea offers, which in turn heightens the risk that 
innocent defendants may be pressured to enter a plea of 
guilty.  To address this problem, the Task Force recommends 
that defendants be provided with easily accessible educational 
resources about the criminal justice system and basic criminal 
procedure, the status of their individual cases, and the collateral 
consequences of taking a plea or being convicted of a crime. 
Initially, it is important to understand the impact that a 
defendant’s lack of understanding about the criminal law and 
criminal process has on the decision-making process.  
Individuals who find themselves caught in the machinery of the 
criminal justice system—a complex and at times opaque 
process—often have little or no training in the how the justice 
system operates.  Therefore, many defendants have only a basic 
understanding of what to expect as they are pushed through the 
process.  Legal terminology can be difficult and confusing.  There 
are many procedural aspects of a criminal proceeding that only 
an attorney or someone experienced in the legal system would 
understand.  Most criminal defendants cannot be expected to 
understand the nature of motion practice, the various reasons 
for numerous court hearings, the purpose behind the defense 
attorney asking certain questions, or the explanation for why the 
process can take such a long time.  Additionally, most 
defendants do not fully understand, let alone know about, the 
collateral consequences of accepting a guilty plea, such as 
prohibitions on obtaining housing and certain licenses, or the 
effects a conviction could have on employment 
opportunities.  This lack of knowledge and understanding can 
make it extremely challenging for defendants to fully appreciate 
what is happening in their cases and to make reasoned and 
thoughtful judgments about the risks of proceeding to trial or 
accepting a plea offer. 
When accepting any plea deal, criminal defendants are 
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required to state on the record that their acceptance is knowing, 
voluntary and that they understand the consequences of their 
acceptance.  In reality, however, many criminal defendants lack 
a basic understanding of the consequences of accepting a plea 
deal.  This is true even after their attorneys have explained the 
consequences to them. 
The Task Force believes that criminal defendants’ lack of 
understanding of the criminal justice system can significantly 
and negatively impact their ability to consider and assess the 
costs and benefits of entering a plea of guilty.  More importantly, 
this lack of understanding can impose added pressure on a 
defendant to accept a plea offer, notwithstanding their 
innocence.  Providing criminal defendants with access to 
additional information will help them make better informed 
decisions regarding the full consequences of accepting guilty 
pleas and not act out of frustration simply to get out of jail and 
see their families.  
Accordingly, the Task Force makes two recommendations to 
address this problem.  First, the Task Force proposes that 
informational materials and videos be created that describe, in 
general terms, how the criminal justice process works and what 
defendants can anticipate will happen as their case proceeds 
through the system.  Second, the Task Force proposes that 
docketing and scheduling information about individual 
defendants’ cases be collected and made easily available to 
defendants, regardless of whether they have been incarcerated 
or released pending a resolution of their matter. 
Turning first to the informational materials and videos, the 
Task Force recommends that information materials about the 
criminal justice system and how it works be created and made 
available to every individual who is arrested or charged.46  In 
addition to written materials, this could include creating a video 
(similar to the video that is shown to jurors at the beginning of 
 
46  The New York Unified Court System website already has basic 
information about a range of subjects, including subjects such as Criminal 
Case Basics (which includes a section on Plea Bargaining), Collateral 
Consequences, Sentencing and Criminal Records & Sealing. See N.Y. State 
Unified Court Sys., Criminal Case Basics, NYCOURTS.GOV, 
https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/Criminal/caseBasics.shtml (last Mar. 17, 
2020). For those defendants without internet access, however, this information 
is inaccessible. 
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jury duty) that defendants who are being held pretrial can 
view.  The written materials and video would provide an 
overview of the criminal justice process, including the stages of 
the criminal prosecution—such as arraignment, discovery, 
motion practice, trial, and appeal.  They would also describe and 
explain each person’s role in the criminal justice system, 
including the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney, as 
well as rights defendants have regarding paperwork, trial, the 
People’s burden, and other information relevant to most 
criminal cases.  The Task Force recommends that these 
materials be made available and the video be shown as soon as 
possible following the accused’s arraignment, and remain 
available for defendants to view at other points in time when 
they would otherwise be waiting idly.  The Task Force also 
recommends creating companion written materials in layman’s 
terms and in various language translations that defendants may 
review in their cells.  
With respect to scheduling and docketing information for 
individual matters, the Task Force recommends that this 
information be made available through kiosks at detention 
centers, courts, and in other areas where individuals are 
held.  The kiosks could serve as information centers where 
defendants can learn about the status of their own cases, find 
contact information for their attorneys, and review the schedule 
of upcoming matters and appearances.  For defendants to learn 
about the publicly available specifics of their own cases, the 
kiosks could allow individuals to type in or scan their docket 
number, which would pull up a list of charges against them.  An 
application on the interface would allow the individuals to listen 
to or read the elements of the charges that the People must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt, similar to pattern jury 
instructions.  An application on the interface would inform 
individuals of the broad range of sentencing exposure and the 
advisability of consulting with their attorney as to potential 
outcomes,47  and another application would inform individuals 
of the proceedings that have already taken place and those that 
are forthcoming.48  The kiosks would have an application that 
defines legal terms in understandable language, and would 
 
47  Similar to New York Prosecutors Training Institute’s Crime Time. 
48  Similar to the Criminal Records & Information Management System. 
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allow defendants to print out individual dockets and the contact 
information for their attorneys.  
 
1. Implementation Considerations 
 
An obvious question is who will create and curate the 
material.  A potential answer is that it could be done by the 
various bar associations, perhaps working with the New York 
State Unified Court System.49  Another question that may arise 
could pertain to the level of specificity that should be included in 
the kiosk information and ways to avoid creating conflicts or 
violating attorney-client privilege.  To solve those issues, the 
kiosks could provide a reminder about the attorney-client 
privilege and could include a disclaimer that the information is 
not, and not a substitute for, legal advice.  And, of course, the 
practical consideration of where the videos and kiosks would be 
placed will require input from those most acquainted with the 
process in each jurisdiction, who could provide the best insight 
regarding where defendants would be able to access the 
information most easily.  
To conclude, individuals charged with crimes lack 
appropriate access to information about their own cases and the 
criminal justice system as a whole.  This information gap fosters 
distrust in the system and a sense of hopelessness that leads 
individuals into making uninformed decisions—including 
pleading guilty when they are innocent of the crimes 
charged.  Bridging this gap is a means to fixing that problem for 
the people whose lives and liberty depend on it, and the Task 
Force recommends implementing informational videos and 
kiosks to achieve that goal. 
 
D. Proposal No. 4: Adopt Recommendations of the NACDL 
Report Dealing with the Trial Penalty and 
Proportionality Between Pre-Trial and Post-Trial 
Sentences 
 
In July 2018, the NACDL issued a report titled “The Trial 
 
49  See N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., supra note 46 (describing the type 
of information that has already been developed by the state court system). 
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Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the Verge of 
Extinction and How to Save It.”50  Based on its findings, the 
NACDL Report listed ten guiding principles, as well as ten 
specific recommendations for reform.  These principles reflect a 
broad range of beliefs, such as the values of the jury trial system, 
the troublesome nature of the decline of the frequency of trials, 
and the damage to society from mass incarceration—
particularly for people of color and the poor.  These principles 
have specific resonance with regard to plea bargaining, in 
expressing that there is a problematic discrepancy between pre-
trial and post-trial sentences, that there are coercive elements 
of plea bargaining, and that choosing to go to trial is a right 
which should not be punished.51 
 
50  NACDL REPORT, supra note 15. 
51  Id. at 11.  
 
The trial penalty—the substantial difference between the 
sentence offered prior to trial versus the sentence a 
defendant receives after a trial—undermines the integrity of 
the criminal justice system. Trials protect the presumption of 
innocence and encourage the government to charge cases 
based only on sufficient, legally-obtained evidence to satisfy 
the reasonable doubt standard. The decline in the frequency 
of trials impacts the quality of prosecutorial decision-making, 
defense advocacy, and judicial supervision. The decline in the 
frequency of trials tends to encourage longer sentences 
thereby contributing to mass incarceration, including mass 
incarceration of people of color and the poor. The decline in 
the frequency of trials erodes the oversight function of the 
jury thereby muting the voice of lay people in the criminal 
justice system and also undercuts the role of appellate courts 
in supervising the work of trial courts. The trial penalty 
creates a coercive effect which profoundly undermines the 
integrity of the plea-bargaining process. A reduction for 
accepting responsibility through a guilty plea is appropriate. 
The same or similar reduction should be available after trial 
if an individual convicted at trial sincerely accepts 
responsibility after trial regardless of whether the accused 
testified at trial or not. No one should be punished for 
exercising her or his rights, including seeking pre-trial 
release and discovery, investigating a case, and filing and 
litigation of pre-trial statutory and constitutional motions.   
 
Id. The NACDL report also recommended the abolition of mandatory minimum 
sentences, which is treated separately in this Report.  See infra at Part 
IV(E)(1)(a). 
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An extreme difference between a sentence agreed to under 
a plea versus a sentence imposed after a trial, and the discretion 
prosecutors have to widen that gap by charging certain crimes 
that trigger mandatory minimum sentences, creates a grave risk 
that innocent people will plead guilty to avoid draconian 
consequences merely for exercising their constitutional right to 
trial.  In circumstances in which the expected sentence after trial 
is substantially more severe than the plea offer (for no reason 
other than the mere fact of exercising the right to trial), a 
defendant’s decision to plead guilty may have little to do with 
their actual guilt; instead, the decision may be explained almost 
entirely by risk-tolerance or risk-avoidance theories.52 
Many of the NACDL Report’s principles and 
recommendations, particularly those that aim to preserve 
criminal defendants’ right to trial and reduce the use of coercive 
plea tactics, are consistent with the objectives of this Report.  
After extensive deliberation, the members of this Task Force 
have overwhelmingly supported adopting two of the NACDL 
Report’s recommendations, insofar as they relate to the New 
York State criminal justice system: 
 
Remove the Trial Penalty:  The government 
should not be permitted to condition plea offers on 
waiver of statutory or constitutional rights 
necessary for an accused person to make an 
intelligent and knowing decision to plead guilty.  
This includes an accused person’s decision to seek 
pretrial release or discovery, investigate a case, or 
litigate statutory or constitutional pre-trial 
motions. 
 
Proportionality Between Pre-Trial and Post-Trial 
Sentencing:  Procedures should be adopted to 
ensure that the accused are not punished with 
substantially longer sentences for exercising their 
right to trial, or its related rights.  Concretely, 
post-trial sentences should not increase by more 
than the following: denial of acceptance of 
 
52  See generally Dervan & Edkins, supra note 3. 
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responsibility (if appropriate); obstruction of 
justice (if proved); and the development of facts 
unknown before trial.53 
 
1. Removing the Trial penalty 
 
The widespread practice of conditioning plea offers on an 
accused’s agreement not to litigate statutory and/or 
constitutional issues undermines transparency, basic fairness, 
and more broadly the integrity of the criminal legal system.54  As 
such, the Task Force recommends adopting the NACDL’s 
recommendation of doing away with the “trial penalty,” thereby 
eliminating prosecutors’ ability “to condition plea offers on 
waiver of statutory or constitutional rights necessary for an 
accused person to make an intelligent and knowing decision to 
plead guilty,” including “an accused person’s decision to seek 
pre-trial release or discovery, investigate a case, or litigate 
statutory or constitutional pre-trial motions.”55  Eliminating the 
trial penalty would give substance to statutory and 
constitutional protections designed to protect innocence and 
proportionality of punishment, as well as provide accountability 
for the conduct of law enforcement.  Further, eliminating the 
trial penalty helps assure fair and proportionate outcomes for 
every person going through the criminal justice system. 
The NACDL Report provides a summary of research 
showing how the trial penalty contributes to wrongful 
convictions by undermining procedural protections that 
elucidate when evidence is unlikely to be compelling prior to 
trial.56  Because the majority of cases are resolved before pre-
trial motions are heard, issues pertaining to the voluntariness of 
an accused’s statements to law enforcement and whether an out-
of-court perpetrator identification procedure is reliable, rarely 
receive evidentiary hearings or meaningful judicial scrutiny.57  
 
53  NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, at 12-13. 
54  Id. at 28-30. 
55  Id. at 59.  
56  Id. at 24-30. 
57  People v. Huntley, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965) (voluntariness of 
statements); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (suggestive 
identification procedures). 
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As a result, coerced confessions and misidentifications, as well 
as other potential abuses (such as instances of police 
misconduct58), are unlikely to come to light. 
New York’s recent bail and discovery reforms have already 
addressed some of the concerns reflected in the NACDL Report’s 
recommendations.59  New York’s new discovery statute, which 
took effect on January 1, 2020, mandates open-file discovery 
early in the life of a criminal case.  Critically, this requires 
prosecutors to comply with discovery obligations prior to the 
expiration of a plea offer, and expressly provides that while the 
accused may waive his or her discovery rights, “a guilty plea 
offer may not be conditioned on such waiver.”60  This level of 
transparency, unique among the country’s criminal discovery 
laws, eliminates one party’s ability to exploit information 
asymmetries in plea negotiations.  Moreover, for the vast 
majority of people facing misdemeanors and nonviolent charges, 
New York’s elimination of pretrial detention removes the 
inherently coercive effect of pretrial incarceration for the large 
number of people in New York’s criminal courts. 
The elimination or reduction of the trial penalty would also 
extend this transparency principle to the litigation of statutory 
and constitutional issues.  As a first step, local and state bar 
associations can support broad adoption of the NACDL 
recommendations and facilitate the drafting of new ethics 
guidelines to regulate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  
Also, District attorneys are encouraged to voluntarily adopt 
limits to their plea-bargaining practices. 
The Supreme Court has granted prosecutors broad latitude 
to leverage their informational and procedural advantages 
against people accused of crimes in order to extract guilty 
pleas.61  Further efforts should be undertaken to explore 
legislative solutions to reform plea bargaining conditions by 
examining the model of the recently passed criminal discovery 
statute, and by expressly prohibiting the conditioning of plea 
offers on the waiver of pre-trial motions.  Legislative limitations 
 
58  See NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, at 8. 
59  Id. at 11-12. 
60  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 245.25(1), (2) (pre-indictment guilty pleas and 
all other guilty pleas, respectively). 
61  See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978). 
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should be implemented only in conjunction with broad 
sentencing reform so that an end to the trial penalty does not 
provoke a reactionary response of elevated charges and plea 
offers. 
 
2. Proportionality Between Pre-Trial and Post-Trial 
Sentencing 
 
Because pre-trial and post-trial sentences are often vastly 
disproportionate,62 it is not surprising that many defendants feel 
as though they are coerced into accepting pre-trial plea offers, 
regardless of the intent of the prosecutors.63  Evidence suggests 
that a large enough discrepancy between expected outcomes can 
lead factually innocent defendants to plead guilty.64 
There can be, however, defensible reasons for a disparity 
between a sentence offered in a plea and one imposed after trial.  
For example, a sentencing disparity resulting from a finding of 
obstruction of justice or the development of facts unknown before 
trial is considered problematic by neither the NACDL nor the 
members of this Task Force.  The existence of obstruction of 
justice is proper grounds for increasing a potential sentence 
following trial because the conduct is independently punishable.  
The development of facts unknown before trial is also a proper 
ground for imposing a different-than-anticipated sentence as 
long as it is relevant in ascertaining the conduct that is being 
punished and in establishing whether the elements of an offense 
have been met. 
The Task Force also agrees with the NACDL Report that 
demonstrated remorse on the part of a defendant who pleads 
guilty is somewhat of an acceptable justification for reducing a 
sentence.  However, basing sentences on a defendant’s 
 
62  “In 2015, in most primary offense categories, the average post-trial 
sentence was more than triple the average post-plea sentence. In antitrust 
cases, it was more than eight times as high.” NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, 
at 15. 
63  See id. at 15-16; see also Jamie Fellner, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How 
U.S. Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty, 26 FED SENT’G 
REP. 276 (2013). 
64  See NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, at 17; see also Lucian E. Dervan, 
Bargained Justice: Plea-Bargaining’s Innocence Problem and the Brady Safety-
Valve, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 95 (2012). 
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demonstrated remorse can be both risky and imprecise because 
it is a subjective determination, and thus runs the risk of 
artificially inflating sentence severity for those who do not 
“accept responsibility” (who exercise their right to go to trial). 
In practice, defendants who plead guilty are credited with 
“acceptance of responsibility” even if they feel no remorse, while 
genuinely remorseful defendants who exercise their 
constitutional right to trial are denied the sentencing credit for 
acceptance of responsibility.  “Acceptance of responsibility” has 
become synonymous with “pleading guilty.”  This sentencing 
framework can pressure defendants into pleading guilty early, 
given that the system dictates that an early guilty plea 
demonstrates remorse.  Because of this, even factually innocent 
defendants may be unwilling to assume the risk of receiving a 
disproportionately harsh post-trial sentence.65  “Acceptance of 
responsibility” as a sentencing factor is a component of the 
framework that contributes to the disproportionality between 
pre-trial and post-trial sentences, and therefore deserves the 
attention of this Task Force. 
The Task Force adopts the NACDL’s reasoning and 
concludes that acceptance of responsibility is an appropriate 
factor to mitigate a defendant’s sentence, but only when it (1) 
reflects true remorse rather than an automatic result of plea-
bargaining; (2) is available even after a defendant has exercised 
their right to trial; and (3) is not used punitively to increase a 
sentence solely because the defendant has exercised their right 
to trial.66  The Task Force recommends that determinations 
regarding “acceptance of responsibility” be decoupled from the 
acceptance of plea offers.  More broadly, consistent with the 
NACDL findings, the Task Force also recommends further 
investigation into avenues to enact comprehensive appellate 
review of the proportionality of sentences either by statute or by 
rule.  In addition, they recommend that further efforts be 
undertaken to develop an implementation plan for this proposal 
that balances the need to curb post-trial sentences that are 
disproportionately severe with the need to preserve judicial 
discretion in sentencing. 
 
65  See NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, at 39-40. 
66  Id. at 40-41. 
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E. Proposal No. 5: Enhancing Judicial Discretion in 
Sentencing 
 
Traditionally, a defining feature of our criminal justice 
system has been the jury trial, where a prosecutor charges a 
defendant and, if the defendant is convicted at trial, a judge 
imposes a sentence.  Today, however, the practical reality of our 
criminal justice system is that criminal trials have given way to 
the resolution of criminal charges through plea agreements, 
which are negotiated privately between the prosecutor and 
defense counsel.  Fewer than five percent of all persons formally 
accused of a crime go to trial.67  More importantly, in New York, 
a plea bargain typically determines the parameters of the 
ultimate sentence.  Thus, the role of judges in determining the 
proper length of a criminal sentence has been significantly 
curtailed. 
Defendants, including those who have been charged with a 
crime but are factually innocent,68 may be confronted with 
having to defend themselves against an offense carrying a 
mandatory minimum sentence.  If the defendant is convicted at 
trial, the judge has no discretion to downwardly depart from the 
mandatory minimum sentence, even if the judge believes that 
the facts warrant such a deviation.  Consequently, factually 
innocent defendants are confronted with a difficult risk-utility 
balancing decision as to whether they should assert their right 
to trial and potentially be convicted (and thereby subject 
themselves to a mandatory minimum), or take a plea deal 
resulting in  a reduced charge that carries a lesser sentence. 
The Task Force recommends that—within New York’s 
current mandatory minimum framework—judges be provided 
with the discretion to depart below a mandatory minimum 
sentence for defendants convicted of non-violent crimes as long 
 
67  NACDL REPORT, supra note 15, at 14.  
68  All defendants are presumed innocent and have a constitutional right 
to a trial. Systemic and other individual factors can have the effect of 
discouraging defendants from exercising this right, sometimes to 
excruciatingly unjust results. This Report addresses solely the predicament of 
factually innocent defendants.  
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as the judge states their reasons for doing so on the record (or in 
a subsequent written decision).  The Task Force does not 
advocate for any specific changes in the Federal sentencing 
guidelines or mandatory minimum statutes.  The Task Force 
believes that any such reforms would be extremely difficult to 
accomplish outside of federal legislation that would affect the 
entire country and not just the state of New York and, in any 
event, the restructuring of the entire federal criminal justice 
system is well beyond the mandate of this Task Force. 
 
1. Mandatory Minimums Sentences 
 
A Brief History of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing 
 
In response to rising crime rates and drug usage during the 
1970s and ‘80s, Congress and several states began passing 
mandatory minimum sentences for, inter alia, drug offenses, 
gun offenses, and sex offenses.69  For example, before the 
enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 by the Obama 
Administration, possessing five grams of crack cocaine carried a 
five year mandatory minimum sentence.70  Similarly the 
“Rockefeller Laws,”  which were passed in New York in 1973, 
prescribed harsh mandatory minimums for a slew of drug 
offenses,71 such as the possession of four ounces of marijuana, 
which even without an intent to distribute carried a fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum sentence.72  By the early 2000s, it had 
become clear that these draconian laws had led to unduly harsh 
sentences, especially in poor communities and among people of 
color.73  Since then, New York has undergone the process of 
chipping away at this mandatory minimum framework—both in 
terms of sentence length and offenses carrying mandatory 
 
69  Frederick P. Hafetz, The “Virtual Extinction” of Criminal Trials: A 
Lawyer’s View from the Well of the Court, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 248 (2019). 
70  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: IMPACT OF THE FAIR 
SENTENCING ACT OF 2010, at 30 (2015). 
71  Madison Gray, A Brief History of New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws, 
TIME (Apr. 2, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1888864,00.html. 
72  Rakoff, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
73  Gray, supra note 71. 
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minimum sentences.74  Nevertheless, New York still has 
numerous offenses75 that carry a mandatory minimum sentence 
from which a judge has no discretion to deviate except in very 
limited circumstances. 
 
2. Pros & Cons of Mandatory Minimum Sentences 
 
The Task Force has considered various arguments as to the 
utility and shortcomings of mandatory minimum statutes. 
 
Pros: 
Mandatory minimums protect the public for a 
prescribed amount of time from behavior the 
legislature has deemed a threat to the public 
welfare.76 
 
Mandatory minimums are a deterrence 
mechanism against recidivism by an individual 
offender, or by other would-be offenders.77 
 
Mandatory minimums might tend to eliminate or 
reduce sentencing disparities among defendants 
convicted of the same crime and among similarly 
situated defendants, particularly as it affects 
minorities.78 
 
Cons: 
Mandatory minimum sentences may exacerbate 
the phenomenon of mass incarceration by 
 
74  Id. 
75  See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.04 (McKinney 2019) (proscribing 
minimum sentences for Class A drug felony offenses); id. § 60.05 (proscribing 
minimum sentences for Class C non-violent felony offenses); id. § 130.95 
(proscribing minimum sentences for non-drug offense predicate felons). 
76  See KEVIN EMAS, MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES: HANDCUFFING THE 
PRISONER OR THE JUDGE? 31 (2014), 
http://amjudges.org/conferences/2014Annual/ConferenceMaterials/ZC-Emas-
Mandatory-Minimum-Sentences-Written-Materials-8-14.pdf. 
77  Id.  
78  Id.  
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uniformly lengthening the sentences of convicted 
persons.79 
 
There is insufficient evidence that—especially in 
narcotics cases—mandatory  minimums lead to a 
reduced likelihood of recidivism.80 
 
Longer sentences increase costs of monitoring and 
providing for prisoners. 
 
Mandatory minimum offenses only take into 
account the specific elements of the offense and do 
not consider the history and circumstances of the 
defendant.81 
 
Judges have no discretion to deviate from the 
minimum—even when there are mitigating 
factors that might justify a deviation, such as the 
ability to weigh the nature and circumstances of 
the crime, as well as the individual who 
committed them, including the risk of reoffending, 
the defendant’s prior record, and any substance 
abuse or mental health issues.82 
 
The Task Force recommends that the New York legislature 
enact provisions which would permit judges—in non-violent 
felony cases83 (as defined by New York’s Penal Law)—to deviate 
 
79  See James Cullen, Sentencing Laws and How They Contribute to Mass 
Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 5, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/sentencing-laws-and-how-they-
contribute-mass-incarceration-0. 
80  See EMAS, supra note 76.  
81  Id. 
82  Id.  
83  The Task Force did not achieve consensus as to whether a judge should 
also have the discretion to deviate from a mandatory minimum for persons 
convicted of violent felonies. We recommend that additional research be 
conducted by subsequent task forces as to the feasibility and advisability of 
providing judges with this discretion. The Task Force also recommends 
conducting empirical studies to examine the utility of eliminating (certain or 
all) mandatory minimum sentences under New York’s Penal Law. 
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from a conviction carrying a mandatory minimum, provided that 
the judge states his or her reasons for doing so on the record, or 
in a subsequent written opinion.  The Task Force further 
recommends the New York Legislature adopt guidelines for 
judges to consider when departing from a mandatory minimum.  
These guidelines could mirror, for example, many of the factors 
federal judges are required to consult when sentencing a 
defendant.84  In determining whether a “sentence is sufficient, 
but not greater than necessary,”85 federal judges are required to 
consult a list of factors, including: 
 
the nature and circumstances of the offense and 
the history and characteristics of the defendant;86 
and 
the need for the sentence imposed: 
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 
respect of the law, and to provide just punishment 
for the offense;87 
to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct;88 
to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant;89 
to provide the defendant with needed educational 
or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective 
manner.90 
 
Under the Task Force’s proposal, prosecutors would have 
the right to appeal any sentence lower than the mandatory 
minimum. 
Providing judges with discretion to deviate from mandatory 
minimum sentences alleviates the arguably coercive effect that 
mandatory minimums play in plea bargaining.  Restoring the 
 
84  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018). 
85  Id. 
86  Id. § 3553(a)(1). 
87  Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
88  Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 
89  Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). 
90  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2018). 
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judicial autonomy judges once enjoyed—and what was 
traditionally within their purview—would make a defendant’s 
choice to assert their right to a trial less onerous and less risky.  
This, in turn, would reduce the likelihood that an innocent 
person would choose to plead guilty to a lesser charge in order to 
escape a mandatory minimum sentence if convicted at trial. 
Sentencing is one of the most difficult and nuanced tasks a 
judge must perform.  It requires the judge to balance society’s 
legitimate concerns—public safety, deterrence, promoting 
respect for the law and reflecting the seriousness of the offense—
while also taking into account possible mitigating factors such 
as the history and characteristics of the defendant.  Unlike the 
legislatures who set mandatory minimums—which focus solely 
on the offense—the sentencing judge hears the underlying facts 
of the case, hears the arguments of both the prosecutor and 
defense counsel, and receives reports from probation offices 
containing extensive background information about the 
defendant.  Given the wealth of information in their hands, the 
Task Force believes judges should be allowed to use their 
practical judgment to arrive at an appropriate sentence. 
 
F. Proposal No. 6:  Reducing the Volume and Impact of 
Low-Level Offenses in the Criminal Justice System 
 
The perceived impediments to pleading guilty are lessened 
if penalties such as those that affect low-level offenses are 
relatively minor.  Even if an innocent defendant understands the 
consequences of a guilty plea, they might decide to plead if the 
sanctions are relatively minor.  Low-level offenses are the 
perfect example of when an innocent person might say “it is 
easier to just plead guilty and pay the fine.”  Of course, the 
collateral consequences of such a plea may extend to well beyond 
paying a fine, including significantly diminishing an individual’s 
quality of life. 
For an overwhelming majority of defendants, involvement 
with the criminal justice system stems from arrests and 
prosecutions for minor offenses.  In 2018, over 270,000 
misdemeanor arrests were made in New York State (nearly half 
of these within New York City), representing two-thirds of all 
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arrests that year.91  A substantial proportion of such arrests are 
for victimless offenses commonly associated with poverty, 
homelessness, addiction, and mental illness.  Of the 
misdemeanor arrests made in New York City in 2016, 27,642 
(18%) were classified as a “theft of services” charge,92 which is 
primarily fare-beating on public transit.93  Additionally, 21,457 
(14%) were made for marijuana charges,94 15,458 (10%) for other 
drug charges, 7543 (5%) for trespassing,95 and 2194 (1.5%) for 
prostitution.96 
 
91  Adult Arrests: 2009 - 2018, N.Y. ST. DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVS., 
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/arrests/nys.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2020). 
92  PREETI CHAUHAN ET AL., JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRENDS 
IN ARRESTS FOR MISDEMEANOR CHARGES IN NEW YORK CITY, 1993-2016, at 143-
44 (2018), http://misdemeanorjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/2018_01_24_MJP.Charges.FINAL_.pdf. 
93  Id. at 137 (stating that 95.1% of “Theft of Services” arrests from 1993-
2016 were for violations of section 165.15(3) of the New York Penal Law). 
94  The state legislature recently passed legislation that would treat 
possession of small quantities of marijuana as a violation, and the New York 
City Police Department (“NYPD”) has announced of a policy of issuing Desk 
Appearance Tickets rather than making arrests in most such cases. See City 
of N.Y., Mayor De Blasio, Commissioner O’Neill Unveil New Policy to Reduce 
Unnecessary Marijuana Arrests, NYC (June 19, 2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr0619/ 
mayor-de-blasio-commissioner-o-neill-new-policy-reduce-unnecessary-
marijuana-arrests; Jesse McKinley & Vivian Wang, Marijuana 
Decriminalization is Expanded in N.Y., but Full Legalization Fails, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/nyregion/marijuana-
laws-ny.html. Despite this development, it nonetheless remains the case that 
a significant number of individuals will be convicted of violations for marijuana 
possession in New York City and other parts of the state.   
95  Defense attorneys in New York City have argued that a substantial 
proportion of trespassing charges are in fact brought against defendants who 
are lawfully present in apartment buildings. See, e.g., M. Chris Fabricant, 
Rousting the Cops, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 30, 2007), 
https://www.villagevoice.com/2007/10/30/rousting-the-cops/ (Bronx public 
defender reporting that he has “had a disgraceful number of innocent clients, 
many of whom plead guilty to a trespassing charge”); Joseph Goldstein, 
Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/nyregion/in-the-bronx-resistance-to-
prosecuting-stop-and-frisk-arrests.html. The then-chief of arraignments for 
the Bronx District Attorney’s Office “had received numerous complaints from 
defense lawyers who claimed that many of the people arrested were not 
trespassers” and upon investigation found that “in many (but not all) of the 
cases the defendants arrested were either legitimate tenants or invited 
guests.” Id. 
96  CHAUHAN ET AL., supra note 92. 
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In New York City, most misdemeanor arrests do not result 
in convictions.  In 2018, sixty-three percent of dispositions for 
such arrests were dismissals of some form.97  The sentence for a 
misdemeanor or violation conviction is generally less than that 
for a felony, but the collateral consequences can be severe.  A 
criminal conviction may cause an individual to be denied 
employment or housing, or even to be legally prohibited from 
working in certain professions.98  For example, people convicted 
of misdemeanors are ineligible for public housing provided by 
the New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”) for periods of 
three or four years.99  A drug offense conviction, regardless of its 
severity, can cause even a lawfully present noncitizen to be 
deported, as can offenses treated under federal immigration law 
as “crimes involving moral turpitude,” which include minor 
offenses such as turnstile jumping, shoplifting, and indecent 
exposure.100  The impact of these collateral consequences 
disproportionately fall upon minority communities.  In New 
York City, the misdemeanor arrest rate for the black population 
is five and a half times as high as that of the white population, 
and for the Hispanic population the arrest rate is three times as 
high.101 
 
 
 
1. Impact on Plea Bargaining and Wrongful Convictions 
 
 
97  New York City Adult Arrests Disposed, N.Y. ST. DIVISION CRIM. JUST. 
SERVS., https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/nyc.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2020). 
98  See, e.g., Jenny M. Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining 
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 
297-303 (2011); see also Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender 
Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 30 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 589-90 (2005). 
99  NYC Hous. Auth., Tenant Selection and Assignment Plan, NYC 23 
(Sept. 23, 2016), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/TSAPlan.pdf. 
100  Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in 
Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758-59 (2013). 
101  MEREDITH PATTEN ET AL., TRENDS IN MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS IN NEW 
YORK, 1980 TO 2017, at 77 (2018), http://misdemeanorjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/FINAL.pdf. 
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The various factors that lead criminal defendants to forsake 
trial and plead guilty are exacerbated in the context of 
adjudicating minor offenses.  Defendants charged with minor 
offenses face strong incentives to plead guilty, despite whether 
or not they are factually guilty. This is owed to the “process 
costs” of proceeding to trial: attending pretrial court 
appearances, enduring pretrial detention, and paying legal fees 
if counsel is retained.102  Even if the risk of a conviction and the 
“trial penalty” are taken into account, such costs may outweigh 
the costs of pleading guilty, and may be more readily apparent 
and compelling than the long-term, often unforeseen collateral 
consequences of conviction. 
In light of these considerations, it is unsurprising that 
virtually all misdemeanor defendants choose to forego trial.  Of 
the 259,016 cases that reached a disposition in New York City 
Criminal Court in 2017, 120,707 (46.6%) were resolved by a 
guilty plea, 111,679 (43.12%) were dismissed or adjudicated in 
contemplation of dismissal (“ACD”), and only 646 (0.25%) 
terminated by a trial verdict.103  A review of exonerations 
subsequent to misdemeanor convictions found that almost 
eighty percent were in cases where the defendant pled guilty, in 
contrast to the sixteen percent of felony exoneration cases where 
the defendant pled guilty.104  While it is impossible to know how 
many more innocent individuals have been convicted of minor 
offenses, it is most likely a substantial number; for most 
defendants in such cases face overwhelming incentives to plead 
guilty. 
In order to reduce the number of innocent people who plead 
guilty, the Task Force recommends that there should be a 
reduction in the volume and impact of low-level offenses in the 
criminal justice system.  The Task Force discussed multiple 
ways of achieving this goal and presents below four examples of 
ways in which the volume and impact of low-level offenses can 
be reduced throughout the New York State criminal justice 
 
102  See Bowers, supra note 10, at 1132-39.   
103  TAMIKO AMAKER & JUSTIN A. BARRY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK OF 
NYC CRIMINAL COURT, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2018),  
https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFs/COURTS/nyc/criminal/2017-Annual-
Report.pdf. 
104  Samuel R. Gross, Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudication, 98 B.U. L. 
REV. 999, 1008 (2018). 
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system. 
 
2. Suggested Solutions 
 
Decriminalize Low-Level Offenses105 
 
The simplest way to reduce the number of low-level cases in 
criminal court and low-level charges on criminal complaints is 
to remove at least some of those low-level criminal charges from 
the New York State and New York City criminal codes.  
Reducing the number of misdemeanor cases and charges would 
have a direct effect on the ability of the accused to adjudicate 
their cases and demonstrate their innocence.  Moreover, the 
imposition of civil fines as a substitute for incarceration may 
have the unintended effect of saddling an individual with 
debt.106 
Some examples of promising legislative decriminalization 
and legalization efforts include: 
 
In 2019, New York State repealed the gravity 
knife provision from the misdemeanor of strict 
liability possession of a weapon under sections 
265.01(1) and 265.00(5) of the Penal Law.107  The 
gravity knife possession crime had been used to 
prosecute tens of thousands of New Yorkers for 
both misdemeanors and felonies, often for 
possessing knives used for work.  In 2018, more 
than eighty-five percent of arrests for gravity 
knife possession in NYC were of Black or Latino 
men or women.108 
 
105  Although the Task Force recommends decriminalizing a number of 
low-level offenses, the Task Force recognizes that certain low-level offenses 
may still require a remedy outside of the criminal justice system. 
106  See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. 
REV. 1055, 1093 (2015). 
107  Jesse McKinley, The “Gravity Knife” Led to Thousands of Questionable 
Arrests. Now It’s Legal, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/31/nyregion/ny-gravity-knife-law.html; 
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.00, 265.01 (McKinney 2019). 
108  See JULIE CICCOLINI, LEGAL AID SOC’Y, GRAVITY KNIFE ARRESTS IN NEW 
YORK CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 2018 – JUNE 29, 2018, at 2 (2018), 
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In 2019, Illinois became the eleventh state to 
legalize the possession of marijuana.109  The 
Illinois law legalizes recreational possession and 
sale of marijuana by adults, and provides for the 
pardon and automatic expungement of previous 
low-level convictions for marijuana.  This law 
stands in contrast to the weaker 2019 New York 
law, which partially decriminalized but did not 
legalize marijuana possession.110 
 
Decline to Prosecute Low-Level Offenses 
 
The charging decision is a significant opportunity for a 
prosecutor to exercise discretion.  Charging decisions should 
reflect an honest and informed analysis of the sufficiency of the 
evidence.111  Yet even when there may be a justifiable basis for 
charging, a prosecutor still has wide discretion to decline to do 
so.112 
The decision not to charge has several other salutary 
efficiency and economic benefits; such as reducing criminal court 
cases, allowing prosecutors to devote resources to serious crimes, 
and avoiding multiple (and often financially and psychologically 
damaging) court appearances by defendants.  Importantly, the 
upfront decision to decline prosecution eliminates any incentive 
for a defendant to plead guilty. 
Several prosecutors around the country, including several 
District Attorneys in New York City, are reviewing and 
establishing policies of declining to prosecute specific crimes, 
specific types of crime (such as non-violent conduct or quality of 
 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59578aade110eba6434f4b72/t/5c8130d8
e5e5f04b9a2dd4fa/1551970520709/gravity_knife_analysis_press.pdf. 
109  Meghan Keneally, Illinois Becomes the 11th State to Legalize 
Marijuana, ABC NEWS (June 25, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/US/illinois-set-
11th-state-legalize-marijuana/story?id=63929963. 
110  See Act of July 29, 2019, ch. 131, 2019 N.Y. S.B. 6579 (partially 
decriminalizing marijuana and expunging convictions for low-level marijuana 
offenses). 
111  See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-
4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).   
112  See id. 
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life crimes), or specific levels of criminal charges.113  These 
practices not only divert low-level and non-violent crimes out of 
the court system, but also acknowledge that some arrests reflect 
racial disparities and conduct connected to poverty.  The Task 
Force applauds the efforts of several of the New York City 
District Attorney’s Offices that have taken the initiative to 
decline to prosecute certain types of low-level non-violent 
conduct.114  The Task Force recommends that all prosecutors 
explore ways to expand the use of discretion to decline 
prosecution and enact policies that make the terms of this 
discretion clear to all assistant prosecutors. 
 
Diversion without Charging or Guilty Pleas 
 
Diversion is generally understood to mean alternatives to 
incarceration where social services replace traditional 
punishment when the root cause of the criminal activity might 
be substance abuse, mental health problems, or youth.  Today, 
many courts have robust post-charging diversion programs 
supported by prosecutors’ offices.  Most focus on minor crimes, 
but in some instances, some diversion programs can be triggered 
by even more serious  criminal charges.  New York’s Center for 
Court Innovation sponsors and implements many diversion 
alternatives.115  The Center for Court Innovation also tracks 
initiatives which could provide additional models in New 
York.116 
The Task Force is heartened by prosecutors’ recognition 
that diversion can be an effective alternative to incarceration.  
We suggest that law enforcement and prosecutors consider the 
circumstances that would justify the implementation of 
diversion prior to charging.  For example, the Brooklyn District 
 
113  See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, in REFORMING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: A REPORT BY THE ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE 71, 73, 93 (Erik Luna ed., 
2017); see GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 14-17.  
114  See GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 12. 
115  See Programs, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, 
http://www.courtinnovation.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). 
116  See, e.g., MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, NIJ’S 
MULTISITE EVALUATION OF PROSECUTOR-LED DIVERSION PROGRAMS (2018), 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2017/Pret
rial_Diversion_Overview_ProvRel.pdf. 
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Attorney has plans to offer pre-plea alternatives for all drug 
possession charges.117  Another example is the Center for Court 
Innovation’s Project Reset Program,118 which provides 
participants the possibility to avoid court and a criminal record 
by completing community-based programming.  Project Reset 
now operates in Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx. 
Court-based diversion programs should not require a guilty 
plea as a condition for entering a program and avoiding 
incarceration, except perhaps in the most serious cases.  First, a 
defendant might be induced to plead guilty regardless of actual 
guilt simply to gain admission to the diversion program rather 
than face a more severe punishment.  Second, even if the 
defendant succeeds in meeting all of the conditions of the 
program, a guilty plea has far-reaching collateral consequences.  
Instead, diversion programs could, when possible, take the lead 
and address the immediate needs of the individual.  For 
example, the programs could provide subway fares, assist in 
obtaining benefits, and refer to social services without requiring 
the defendant to repeatedly return to court.  Compliance with 
the conditions of diversion could be monitored with written 
submissions to the court. 
 
Expungement & Declining to Consider Past Convictions 
 
Many New Yorkers accused of crimes come into criminal 
court at an extreme disadvantage in the plea-bargaining 
process.  Indeed, studies demonstrate that it is often past 
convictions that dictate how a prosecutor will treat a case in New 
York City Criminal Court, even more than the facts of the case 
itself, especially in misdemeanor cases.119  This disadvantage 
can be cured through (i) legislative action to facilitate 
expungements; (ii) executive action through mass pardons; and 
(iii) district attorney policies to seek expungements and to 
 
117  See GONZALEZ, supra note 23, at 12. 
118  See Project Reset, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/programs/project-reset (last visited Mar. 18, 
2020). 
119  See generally ISSA KOHLER-HAUSSMAN, MISDEMEANORLAND (2018) 
(conducting a long-term empirical study of the use of criminal records in 
misdemeanor cases in New York City). 
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decline to consider past convictions in plea bargaining decisions. 
 
Legislative action: The New York State 
legislature and the New York City Council can 
aim to pass laws that facilitate, and where 
possible automate, expungements of past 
convictions, including for serious felonies after a 
certain period of time. 
 
Executive clemency: The Governor of New York 
can use his or her clemency powers to engage in 
mass pardons of low-level convictions and older 
felony convictions. 
 
Prosecutorial discretion to seek expungements 
and not consider past convictions: District 
Attorneys in New York City should be on the 
frontlines of efforts to ensure that past convictions 
do not interfere with plea bargaining.  They can 
do so in at least two ways.  First, District 
Attorneys can facilitate the expungement of past 
convictions using existing laws.  Second, they can 
enact policies under which they decline to 
consider past low-level offenses and related 
warrants during bail proceedings and plea-
bargaining negotiations.  Past low-level offenses 
would not be considered if such offenses are no 
longer crimes, would no longer be prosecuted 
today, or are related to poverty, addiction, or 
racialized policing.120 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
From the inception of our Republic, a fair trial has been the 
guiding principle of our criminal justice system.  In the past 200 
years, the basic way people are convicted of a crime has 
 
120  For more on the connections between prosecutors and expungements, 
see Brian M. Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters: Prosecutorial Discretion and 
Expungement, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2825 (2018). 
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substantially changed.  Plea agreements predominate, while the 
trial by jury has become a decreasingly viable “right.”  One of the 
unplanned effects of the ubiquity of plea bargaining has been 
that unacceptable numbers of innocent people plead guilty and 
are criminally punished.  The proposals set forth in this Report 
should not be particularly controversial.  The Task Force 
considered over 100 proposals.  Feasibility and impact were our 
guiding principles.  The overwhelming consensus of the Task 
Force was that these six proposals are achievable and corrective. 
The Task Force believes that the recommendations put 
forward in this Report will have a direct impact on the dignity 
and self-respect of individuals going through the criminal justice 
system, and will help to prevent the tragic, unjust decision 
innocent people make when they plead guilty to a crime they did 
not commit.  Moreover, these recommendations will assure the 
integrity of the criminal justice process, which is itself a goal of 
paramount importance during a time of public cynicism as well 
as an eroding confidence in lawyers and the courts.  A system 
that tolerates, and even encourages, incorrect and unfair results 
demeans all of those who participate in it.  This Report outlines 
what the Task Force believes are reasonable reforms.  The time 
to implement them is now. 
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